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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the generic determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) assessed using 
data for 65 countries over the period between 1991 and 2017 by employing a panel data model.   The 
goal of this study is to provide a more holistic view that highlights the variables that are significant 
in determining FDI regardless of the widely varying economic and institutional platforms across 
countries, regions and continents. The countries selected vary widely across trade facilitating 
infrastructure, technology platform, investor perception/ investment profile and economic 
environment. This study also applies control variables GDP, GDP per Capita, population, and 
inflation to avoid omitted variable bias. 
 
Results show that the generic variables that drive FDI are Exports as percentage of GDP, Imports as 
a percentage of GDP, Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP, General Government 
Final Expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Cellular Subscription as a portion of population and 
International Country Risk Guide Investment Profile. On the other hand natural resource rents, tax 
revenue as a % of GDP, and GDP growth do not result to be significant in FDI for this wide-ranging 
dataset. 
 
Research Contribution:  
This study contributes to the topic in that: 
o It criticises Ease of Doing Business Indicators due to methodological inconsistencies and 
mechanical changes of index computation and replaces these variables with International 
Country Risk Guide Indices that measure institutional quality in addition to Freedom House 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights. 
o Unlike most recent literature, seeks to determine a large categorically diverse group of 
variables over a large set of characteristically diverse countries, in determining the variability 
of FDI. 
 
In addition, although there is abundant research of this topic, new research and new assessment 
techniques continue to surface on the topic due to FDI importance and potential in shifting the 
fortunes of global economies and standards of living. 
 
The limitation of this study is that policy makers may need to complement this research with existing 
abundant FDI determinants research, narrower in scope and detail oriented in terms of dimension; 
i.e. countries, regions, and variables. Accordingly, governments may have a more comprehensive 
view based on recent research in determining FDI seeking based policy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Abundant literature has hypothesized that FDI is directly correlated with a country’s economic growth, 
it plays an important role in acquiring capital for investment, improving human capital and transferring 
technology between different economies however FDI is still subject to major discussion for both 
economists and policy makers.  (Asiedu, 2002; Akinlo, 2004; Anyanwu and Yameogo, 2015, Barua, 
Naym and Nessa 2017). 
 
Previous research has shown diverse and inconsistent results for the determinants of FDI especially with 
the following significantly relevant variables: GDP growth, trade openness, institutional and economic 
measurement indices, taxation, among others. Quantitative analysis along with economic theory have 
led to the following research results on the topic: 
o That a strong investment climate, illustrated through differing variables is key for countries 
to attract foreign direct investment (Okafor, Piesse and Webster (2017) and Chanegriha, 
Stewart and Christopher Tsoukis (2015). 
o That country institutional quality is a key FDI determinant across all literature; the presence 
of well-structured institutions promotes a multitude of legal and investment rights and 
accordingly lead to better economic prospects, in turn attracting foreign investment. 
(Chanegriha, Stewart and Tsoukis study (2016), Grosse and Trevino (2005), Tun et al. (2012), 
Mina (2012) and Aziz (2018). (please see end of section note on selected variable) 
o That trade is a catalyst for economic growth and FDI; open economies grow faster hence 
trade openness is a key determinant to FDI. (Chakrabarti 2001; Moosa and Cardak (2006), 
Kinuthia,  Kinyanjui and Mansoob (2017), Okafor, Piesse  Webster (2017). 
o Mixed results on whether tax incentives constitute an important part of the corporate tax 
policy targeted at attracting FDI for developing nations such as Africa. (Kleem and Parys 
(2011), Jorgenson (1963), Devereux et al. (2008) and Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002). 
o That human capital is a key determinant for FDI inflows on the theoretical premise that low 
skills and an inadequate level of training adversely affect the rate of return of FDI  and 
therefore deter foreign investment (Lukas (1990) and Easterlin (1981),  Hakro & Omezzine 
(2011), Scholes & Wolfson (1990) and Desai et al. (2004). 
 
As such, a more recent assessment of the significant generic determinants of FDI that are unbiased to 
the disparity in characteristics for different economies and economic platforms, would add value from a 
holistic perspective, to complement the abundant research available with a narrow scope on selected 
variables, countries and regions.  In this context, we believe this research adds value through contributing 
to a broader scoped analysis and assessment of the generic FDI determinants. 
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In summary, this study re-examines the generic significant determinants conducive to FDI, regardless of 
the economic characteristics and geographic locations. An assessment spanning 1991 to 2017 is 
implemented due to the limitation in data before the 1990’s and the relative significant shifts in economic 
frameworks over time which may render older data disruptive rather than value adding. Data for 65 
countries was analyzed to remain true to the spirit of this research in attempting to pinpoint the generic 
major determinants of FDI.  
 
This research analyzes 30 variables and 65 countries (list of selected countries in Annex), with 
countries selected in descending order based on FDI as a percentage of GDP. This will be assessed using 
panel data estimation with fixed effects for both cross-section and period. FDI inflows as a percentage 
of GDP was selected as the dependent variable to better gauge the contribution of FDI to respective 
economies as FDI in US dollar terms ignores the relative contribution of FDI to Market size. 
 
(NOTE: World Bank Ease of Doing Business Indicators have been widely criticized by researchers, 
which has driven the free data to be less abundantly used in research papers. The main factual criticism 
is based on the numerous and frequent methodological changes that the World Bank has implemented 
in computing Ease of Doing Business Indicators. These frequent changes have made the data less 
valuable to researchers who wish to assess the index score effect son other variables over long time 
periods, since a 10 to 15-year score analysis will be mechanically void form a comparative basis (Doing 
business.org).  
 
As such, ICRG was used due to its methodology in utilizing experts to systematically assess country 
ratings via a predetermined set of questions and data, to determine index scores for all political and 
institutional variables associated with investment. Unlike Ease of Doing Business indices where data is 
limited with large country samples and longer time periods, ICRG provides comprehensive data for long 
periods of time, for 140 global markets. ICRG is also the only political risk methodology and data series 
to be accepted by the courts in commercial disputes involving the valuation of political risk (prsgroup) 
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II. LTERATURE REVIEW 
 
The 20th century last few decades saw a rise in the foreign direct investment inflows which led 
consequently to an increase in economic literature trying to determine the drivers of FDI. Defining FDI is 
crucial in the context of this study; FDI net inflows, as a percentage of GDP measure the value of inward 
direct investment made by non-resident investors in an economy (World Bank, 2018). The most widely 
used framework is the Organization, Location and Internalization Paradigm (OLI) paradigm, Paradigm, 
pioneered by John Dunning1 in 1980. According to his theory, a company needs all three advantages to be 
able to successfully engage in FDI. Hence, the most basic question to be asked is why should a firm 
(MNCs) choose to fully operate and engage a in a foreign market, rather than finding an alternative option 
such as exporting or licensing agreements.  
 
In light of the above, four group of variables have been identified throughout this study:  
i. Political and Institutional Quality Variables: International Country Risk Guide Government, 
Socio-Economic Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, 
Religious Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Bureaucracy Quality, Democratic 
Accountability, Freedom House Index Political Rights and Freedom House Index Civil Liberties; 
ii. Macroeconomic Economic Variables: access to electricity (% of population), Exports of goods 
and services (% of GDP), Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US$), Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP), Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), GDP (current US$), GDP growth 
(annual %), GDP per capita (current US$), Tax revenue (% of GDP), Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %), Current account GDP, Manufacturing VA % of GDP, Government final CE % GDP; 
iii. Human Capital Variables: labor force, population, mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people); 
iv. Endowment Variables: total natural resources rents and surface area;  
 
(i) Political and Institutional Quality Variables 
 
The quality of institutions is most likely to be one of the most important FDI determinant across all 
literature. Well-functioning markets are associated with good institutional quality; poor quality increases 
the cost of doing business thus it constitutes a threat to investment. Having a holistic environment that 
promotes property rights, rule of law, government stability, lack of internal and external conflict and 
corruption control make a country more attract to foreign investment and lead to better economic outlook. 
Remarkably, Grosse and Trevino (2005), Tun et al. (2012), Mina (2012) and Aziz (2018) research papers’ 
argue that the stability of a government is directly correlated with a country’s economic growth hence 
                                                             
1 John Dunning is a pioneer in international business theory, he put forward “eclectic paradigm – OLI framework” to study FDI 
and multinational companies’ behavior when engaging in international business.  
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attract higher FDI. Secondly, poor institutions which accept corruption create an additional costs similarly 
to taxes thus decreases profitability and make the business environment difficult to operate in  (Al-Sadig 
2002). Thirdly, high involvement of military in politics is an indication that the government can’t operate 
independently making the overall environment is not conducive to foreign direct investment.  
 
 These findings are consistent with Chanegriha, Stewart and Tsoukis (2016) study which showcases that 
nations with greater democratic accountability have higher FDI. Shahzad et al. (2012) argues that political 
stability enhances the probability of attracting more FDI inflows into the developing countries. Equally, 
Aziz (2018) research indicates that in the Arab World institutional quality variables of Doing Business, 
economic freedom and International Country Risk (ICRG) have a positive and significant impact on FDI 
inflows. Whereas Masron and Nor (2013) found that variables like regulatory quality control, rule of law 
and corruption are bound to have a an important role in attracting FDI inflows in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Tintin (2013) test the determinants of FDI inflows in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) and his results show that economic freedoms, state fragility and political rights, 
have the most significant impact. Conversely, Paul et al. (2014) studying the same region found the 
accuracy and efficiency of public administration is the most appropriate framework in attracting FDI and 
can never be substituted by market forces. Overall, a high political risk calculated through the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Freedom House make investors feel uncertain and decreases the chances 
of investment.  
 
(ii) Macro-Economic Variables 
 
This set of variables highlights the economic investment climate which influences how investors assess 
returns and risks associated with taxes, market size, and government balance of payment, exports and 
imports as well as inflation.    
 
One of the most important economic indicators is GDP growth, it is significant with a country’s total 
production and consumption of a variety of goods and services. The GDP growth rate is an influencing 
factor for those who wish to invest in a foreign country. Gross and Trevino (1996) highlighted that 
countries possessing a higher GDP growth rate are expected to promote a large dose of FDI, encourage 
potential multinational companies (MNCs) to invest without a debt and more specifically when growth is 
consistent and stable.  Nevertheless, some economists find GDP to be inversely significant to FDI, such 
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as Buchanan et al. (20122), Jensen (20033), and Wint and Williams (20024). FDI could be attracted to 
economies where going through period of recessions where capital and labor costs are less costly or when 
firms could profit from underutilized resources such as an abundant supply of cheap labor in low growth 
economies. Equally, market size and growth rate could not serve as key-determinants for FDI where MNCs 
will choose an economy for the cost of resources (transportation, labor, energy, capital) regardless of the 
economy growth (Zhang (20015) and Akinlo, 20046). 
 
It is entirely possible that market size and market growth might not be important considerations for export-
oriented and extractive motives for FDI. Torrisi (1985) and Zhang (2001b) argue that export-oriented FDI 
is motivated by factor-price differentials, such as labor 8 cost, and transportation cost from host countries 
to other countries in the region. For example, in Africa, extractive FDI is located in several mineral-rich 
countries, where market size and growth rate are not the key motivation for FDI (Akinlo, 2004). 
Consequently, in such cases, economic growth and FDI will be unrelated. 
 
Equally, in developed nations such as the US and UK, Papanastassiou and Pearce (1990), Culem (1988) 
and Sader (1993) found a strong correlation between the market-size of the host country and FDI. 
Whereas, Asiedu (2002) there is no significant impact of growth or market size on FDI inflows in Africa 
and developing nations.  
 
Adding to the above, in developing and emerging economies, higher government expenditure is associated 
with development expenditures, namely infrastructure development, this creates a better business 
environment and stronger institutions attracting more FDI inflows (Panigrahi and Panda, 2012; 
Noorbakhsh et al.2001; He and Sun, 2014). This was also showcased for Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Philippines as well India and China in a panel data study spanning from 1982 until 2016, in 
which Othman, Yusop, Andaman and Ismail (2018) demonstrated that government spending contributes 
positively towards FDI inflows in the long run. However, non-productive public expenditures does not 
enhance economic growth this does not attract FDI. The case is demonstrated in the OECD’s countries in 
Bleaney et al (2001) and developed countries in Mitchell (2005) who both argued that large and growing 
government is not conducive for better economic performance.  
                                                             
2 Buchanan, B. G., Le, Q. V., & Rishi, M. (2012). Foreign direct investment and institutional quality: Some empirical evidence. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 21: 81- 89. 
3 Jensen, N. M. (2003). Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct 
investment. International Organization, 57(3): 587-616. 
4 Wint, A. G., & Williams, D. A. (2002). Attracting FDI to developing countries: A changing role for government? International 
Journal of Public Sector Management, 15(5): 361- 374. 
5 Zhang, K. H. (2001a). Does foreign direct investment promote economic growth? Evidence from East Asia and Latin America. 
Contemporary Economic Policy, 19(2): 175-185 
6 Akinlo, A. E. (2004). Foreign direct investment and growth in Nigeria: An empirical investigation. Journal of Policy Modeling, 26: 
627-639. 
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According to the studied literature, Trade Openness is the most robust as shown in several studies. 
Chanegriha, Stewart and Tsoukis’s (2016) presents two separate extreme bound analysis to determine 
economic, geographical and institutional variables and their results shows that trade openness is significant 
in 26 out of the 27 cases., similarly to the results of Chakrabarti (2001), Moosa and Cardak (2006), 
Kinuthia,  Kinyanjui and Mansoob (2017), Okafor, Piesse  Webster (2017). 
 
Starting 1990s, a big number of countries have embarked on a series of market reforms; as part of the 
structural adjustment program import-substitution has been replaced by export-led growth and removed 
trade barriers.  
Many economists argue that there is a relationship between exports rate and FDI inflows; a country’s 
export led grown should theoretically lead to an improvement in the balance of payments and a stabilizing 
factor for the exchange rate. This was significant in the results of Navaretti, Venables, & Barry (2004) and 
Markusen & Maskus (2002). Exports of goods and services source foreign dominated currency which 
contributes to the increase of reserves and economic productivity; this helps raise per capita incomes, 
increase capital investment. This accelerator effect generates more FDI inflows.   
 
Equally, a country’s level of imports, Aizenman and Noy (2005) have outlined a significant relationship 
between imports and FDI inflows as well as Geweke's (1982). Nevertheless, Evguenia et al., (2003), 
Lawrence and Weinstein (1999), Edwards (1998) and Sachs and Warner (1995) discusses the conditions 
in which imports may lead to significant FDI inflows where MNCs will have to import specific supplies 
and materials to maintain their required standards or when rise in imports justifies investment and 
production. Otherwise, in some cases, the rising capital inflows as well as the rising level of imports 
outweighed by an increasing level of exports, may appreciate domestic currency and worsen the 
economy’s current account balance. (Kim and Kim, 2006 and Abell, 1990.). 
 
According to Plossner & Levine and Renelt (1992) gross capital formation directly influences economic 
growth in two ways: increasing the physical capital stock or by promoting technology indirectly which 
leads a country to be more attractive to FDI inflows. The aforementioned is consistent with A. Amighini,. 
McMillan and Sanfilippo’s (2017) findings where gross fixed capitation formation to GDP was positive if 
only MNCs participate in manufacturing production.  
 
The inflation is among the most debated variables in influencing FDI inflows. In theory, high inflation is 
significantly associated with internal economic instability. Nevertheless, Zaman et al. (2006) found that 
inflation rate has a positive significant impact on FDI inflows in Pakistan, correspondingly, to the impact 
of inflation was negative and significant in the Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA region as put forward 
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Okafor, Piesse and Webster. Whereas, Cleeve, Debrah, Yaw and Zelealem (2015) who found that inflation 
that was found highly insignificant in all cases for Africa.   
 
Introducing a new dimension in the infrastructure literature, argues that 1% rise in electricity availability, 
as a variable for infrastructure, increases FDI by as high as 7.70%.  
 
Finally, taxes will be discussed as the last component of economic climate. Growing literature analyzes 
both risks and benefits of using tax incentives despite the overall skepticism especially in developing 
countries. One of the most common hypotheses discussed abundantly in  research is that higher taxes 
discourages FDI inflows. However, the effects of taxes on FDI can vary significantly according to the type 
and how the FDI activity is measured.  
 
The neo-classical investment theory argues that a firm accumulates capital as long as the benefits exceed 
the costs. Hence, if tax reductions decrease the user cost of capital, investment goes up (Jorgenson 1963). 
This gave rise to the calculation of marginal effective tax rates which allow to calculate the impact of tax 
on costs by studying the following parameters: statutory tax rate, investment allowances, tax credits. 
According to Hartman (1984 – 1985), some types of FDI are not sensitive to taxes; the relationship 
between investment and tax incentives in developing countries depends on the definition of investment, 
on the type of tax incentives and on the region. Klemm and S. Van Parys (2012) argues that strategic 
interaction over taxes is not restricted to tax rates, but is equally present on tax incentives, notably tax 
holidays. Moreover, their work also showed that lowering tax rate or attracting tax holidays help attract 
FDI in the countries of Latin American but not in Africa. This was also shown in S. Van Parys and S. 
James (2010) who found that tax holidays in the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc zone in 
Sub Saharan Africa over the period 1994–2006. Moreover, their study also shows that reducing the 
complexity of tax incentives and improving the legal guarantees for foreign investors has a positive impact 
on investment, especially in developing countries. 
 
(iii) Human Capital Variables 
 
Few studies focus on human capital as a key determinant for FDI inflows, rather, they incorporate as one 
of their control variables in their analysis. The term “human capital” was devised by T.W. Schultz and 
G.S. Becker, defined as “a set of characteristics, natural talents, predispositions, attitudes, respected values, 
acquired abilities and knowledge of people, which may be enriched through investment7.” Lukas (1990) 
and Easterlin (1981) argue that low skills and inadequate level of training adversely affect the rate of 
                                                             
7M. Niklewicz-Pijaczyńska, M. Wachowska, Wiedza – Kapitał ludzki – Innowacje, University of Wroclaw, Wroclaw 2012, pp. 45 
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return of FDI, and thus negatively impact capital inflows. In a more recent study, Cleeve, Debrah, Yaw 
and Zelealem (2015) investigates the relationship between FDI and Human Capital (HK), in the form of 
education: no school, literacy, gross secondary school enrollment ratio, tertiary enrollment ratio, and 
average years of schooling. Their study found that irrespective of the indicator of educational attainment 
used and composition of control variables considered, the FDI effect of human capital was found to be 
robustly positive and significant. Okafor, Piesse and Webster (2017) on the MENA region and Africa 
highlights that human capital, represented by the percentage of the population in technical education, has 
an insignificant impact on FDI; this could be explained by the fact that human capital in these regions has 
not yet reached the required threshold in technical education to stimulate efficiency and attract skill-
seeking FDI. Additionally, a well-educated labor force can be key in attracting FDI. This result is 
accordance with Hakro & Omezzine (2011), Scholes & Wolfson (1990) and Desai et al. (2004).  
 
Likewise, wireless mobile technology which is considered among technology’s infrastructure is associated 
with higher FDI inflows. Soremekun and Malgwi (2012) illustrates this relationship by studying via 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), using the Partial Correlation (PC) and Greedy Equivalence Search 
(GES) algorithms in 47 African emerging markets for three time periods – 2001, 2004 and 2006. Their 
results show a growth in mobile technology in African economies and antecedent of FDI, in line with 
Koyuncu and Ünver (2016). Several economic studies suggest that African economies are largely left 
behind developmentally when it comes to foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The adoption of wireless 
mobile technology is increasingly gaining popularity globally and most especially in Africa. There is a 
directed effect from mobile phone growth to FDI. 
 
An often neglected variable is the population of a country, popular belief assumes that a large population 
could lead to a decline in economic growth. Thomas Robert Malthus 8asserted that large population was a 
big problem for developing countries. In a sample of 56 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Asia, 
Abdul Aziz (2012) found that a country’s population size is be positively related to FDI. However, investors 
must find the highly educated, trained and skilled workforce. This was also consistent with the findings of 
Trkulja (2005).  
 
Moreover, there has been extensive research on the interrelations between FDI and employment. Labor 
market is equally important to macroeconomic indicators, influencing the decisions of foreign investors 
and MNCs. According to Blanchard 2011, higher unemployment rate generates two advantages a big 
number of labor force at low wages. However, according to, Barua, Suborna,  Naym, Junnatun and 
Hazera-Tun-Nessa (2017) unemployment rate found to have significant but negative impact on FDI 
                                                             
8 English cleric and scholar, influential in the fields of political economy and demography, (1766-1834) 
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inflows. In an effort to identify the causality between both factors, Strat, Davidescu, Maria Paul (2014)  
explains that therefore that foreign investors will search locations where the availability of the work force 
will not be a problem.  
 
Endowment Variables(Wheeler and Mody 1992) whereas factor endowments theory argues that FDI is 
drawn to those countries where lower wages and more abundant natural resources prevail.  
Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) highlights that the determinants of FDI are characterized by factor 
endowments and raw materials. According to Aziz and Mishra (2015), FDI in Arab economies appears to 
be resource seeking since the total oil supply variable is positive and significant in the Arab economies. 
However, Mina (2007) previously examined the OLI paradigm in Gulf Council Countries using panel data 
over the period from 1980 to 2002 and found that reserves and oil production have negative influence on 
FDI inflows which is contrary to the expectations of positive relation between oil resources and FDI 
inflows. The positive relationship could be explained by analyzing where FDI tend to flow; Wright & Zhu 
(2018) explains that it tends to flow where the control of key economic sectors is in the hand of dictators 
and strong families and where high level of corruption and lack of institutional constraints exist.  
 
On the other hand, very little research mentions how the surface area of a country influences FDI. 
However, Chanegriha, Stewart and Tsoukis (2016) found that coastal countries attract more FDI than 
landlocked ones, this is also consistent findings in of Easterly and Levine (2001). Additionally, they found 
that Spanish and Arabic speaking countries were more prone to attract FDI.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
i. Selected Variables9 
The below variables have been selected based on their potential significance in determining FDI, on the 
back of contemporary economic theory. Some variables such as tax revenue as a % of GDP were selected 
due to the lack of data on other variables for the selected country sample. 
 
• DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
o FDI as a % of GDP is selected as the dependent variable rather than FDI in absolute 
value.to calibrate FDI relative to market size.  
• INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
o Exports, imports are measures of trade and trade infrastructure.  
o Government Expenditure is usually conducive to FDI, especially in less prosperous 
countries where government spending can be a lifeline to struggling economies.  
o Cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants are selected to measure technological 
infrastructure. 
o Access to electricity which indicates that there is a conducive core infrastructure for 
all types on investment. 
o International Country Risk Guide is a renowned institution which computes 
institutional quality via measurement of multiple indices that measure, corruption 
bureaucracy, legal rights, etc.. ICRG use specific well-structured questions and get 
professionals on each topic to compute the ranking for each country based on the same 
uniform set of criteria. 
o Natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP is selected to control for cash lush 
resource rich countries 
 
Other generic control variables were inserted to avoid omission bias in explaining FDI, such as Market 
Size (GDP), GDP Per Capita, Population, Labor Force, Natural Resource Rents and Surface Area. 
 
TABLE 1 : SELECTED VARIABLES 
#
  
Variable Definition  
1.  Foreign Direct Investment Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, as a % of 
GDP 
                                                             
9 Please refer to ANNEX 1 for longer definitions, calculation method and sources of each variable.  
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2.  Access To Electricity Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. 
3.  Tax Revenue Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for 
public purposes, as a % of GDP 
4.  Exports Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the rest of the world, as a % of GDP 
5.  Imports Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other 
market services received from the rest of the world, as a % of GDP 
6.  Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost 
7.  Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross fixed capital formation is essentially net investment. It is a component 
of the Expenditure method of calculating GDP. 
8.  Current Account Balance Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and services, as a 
% of GDP 
9.  Gdp $ GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products.  
10.  GDP Growth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. 
11.  GDP Per Capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population 
12.  Manufacturing Value Added Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37, as a % 
of GDP 
13.  Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure 
General government final consumption expenditure, as a % of GDP 
14.  Surface Area Surface area is a country's total area 
15.  Population Total population is based on the de facto definition of population 
16.  Labor Force Labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who supply labor for the 
production of goods and services during a specified period 
17.  Cellular Subscription Per 100 
Inhabitants 
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile 
telephone service, using cellular technology 
18.  Icrg Government Stability (GS) Assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office 
19.  Icrg Socio-Economic 
Conditions (SC) 
Assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could 
constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction 
20.  Icrg Investment Profile (IP) Assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by 
other political, economic and financial risk components 
21.  Icrg Internal Conflict (IC) Assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential 
impact on governance.   
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i. Descriptive Statistics 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 30 SELECTED VARIABLES 
 
AELC CELL CA EX-GDP FDI FRAI-CL FRAI-PR GDP Bn GCAP ‘k GDP-G GFCE GFCF IC-BQ IC-COR IC-DA IC-EC IC-ET IC-GS 
 Mean 87.19 67.25 -0.93 42.86 5.63 2.08 1.97 736.00 20.18 3.09 17.71 21.86 2.73 3.60 5.02 10.50 4.36 7.98 
 Median 100.00 74.05 -1.40 36.07 2.71 2.00 1.00 164.00 12.20 3.10 18.46 21.49 3.00 3.50 5.50 10.50 4.50 7.92 
 Maximum 100.00 172.18 24.71 222.70 123.10 6.00 7.00 18,600.00  119.22 25.56 30.05 42.79 4.00 6.00 6.00 12.00 6.00 11.08 
 Minimum 0.04 0.00 -61.55 6.98 -43.46 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.22 -14.76 4.54 8.95 0.00 1.00 1.00 5.25 0.92 2.00 
 Std. Dev. 25.99 49.43 7.19 28.76 11.67 1.39 1.58   2,100.00  21.22 3.48 4.56 4.67 1.16 1.32 1.23 1.26 1.21 1.59 
 Skewness -1.97 -0.02 -1.34 2.47 5.23 1.23 1.57 5.86 1.53 -0.03 -0.21 0.47 -0.51 0.14 -1.17 -0.91 -0.33 -0.13 
 Kurtosis 5.50 1.58 13.76 11.76 39.52 3.45 4.14 40.62 5.75 7.45 2.50 4.36 2.24 1.94 3.32 3.73 2.39 2.56 
 
 
 ICRG_IC ICRG_IP ICRG_L_O ICRG_MIP ICRG_RT ICRG_SC IMP INFL LBR Mn MVA ResRents POP Mn SURA Mn TAXREV 
 Mean 9.89 8.90 4.45 4.84 5.02 6.59 42.90 13.20 15.85 14.50 4.92 35.14 0.91 19.38 
 Median 10.00 8.83 5.00 5.50 5.00 6.79 35.14 3.09 5.98 14.72 0.81 14.69 0.31 18.71 
 Maximum 12.00 12.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 11.00 236.39 2075.89 163.00 50.64 60.12 323.00 9.98 55.34 
 Minimum 4.25 3.00 1.00 0.00 1.50 1.00 7.91 -4.48 0.14 1.53 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.48 
 Std. Dev. 1.58 2.23 1.29 1.54 1.02 2.28 27.31 101.37 26.36 5.78 10.07 54.23 2.10 7.68 
 Skewness -0.64 -0.15 -0.50 -1.39 -1.24 -0.27 2.63 17.77 3.69 0.82 3.25 3.22 3.60 0.98 
 Kurtosis 2.98 1.91 2.28 4.13 4.29 2.47 12.82 339.13 18.18 7.60 14.14 14.65 14.64 5.32 
 
Table 2 above illustrates the descriptive statistics for all the 33 variables tested before refining the model based on auto correlation and the model 
results. The table is illustrative in that gives an aggregated summary descriptive of the values for each variable with a main view to the mean, minimum, 
maximum and standard deviation. Skewness and kurtosis are additionally displayed the model analysis. 
 
Several outlier packages are available in EVIEWS and other econometric platforms, however, in this paper, data was assessed manually on a country 
by country basis for each variable and where outliers were found all variables for the respective period with outliers was fully removed (which along 
with the removal of missing data contributed to the model being unbalanced). Although automatic packages are undisputedly stronger resources, the 
manual method was utilized to use subjectivity to maintain data points which may seem like outliers but would omit relevant datapoints in explaining 
the dependent variable. As such, extreme data points which do not contribute to a concise view for each country were subjectively eliminated. 
 
The minimum/maximum figures in the statistics above may appear as outliers such as in GDP. However, these were used in the paper along with other 
variables as control variables which contributed to minimizing omitted variable bias. 
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ii. Selected Estimation Mechanics 
 
o REDUNDANT FIXED EFFECTS TESTS 
 
We use EVIEWS to test the significance of both the Cross Section and Period, F-test, and the Chi-Square to test 
likelihood function. Results show very strong significance in rejecting the null hypothesis that cross section 
effects are redundant. Evaluating the joint significance of both cross section and period also significantly rejects 
the null hypothesis which facilitates for us to proceed with fixed effects modelling as the more suited 
methodology to the data. 
 
TABLE 3 – Redundant Fixed Effects Test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects    
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
    
Cross-section F 3.982719 (51,798) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 205.222067 51 0.0000 
Period F 0.845110 (25,798) 0.6841 
Period Chi-square 23.648960 25 0.5397 
Cross-Section/Period F *** 3.050371 (76,798) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square *** 230.810007 76 0.0000 
  
 
iii.  Selected Model Iterations 
 
o Final Variable Selection: 
𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑮𝑫𝑷𝓲𝒕 = 𝒄 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟑(𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑳𝑮𝒅𝒑𝓲𝒕) 
+ 𝜷𝟓(𝑮𝒅𝒑 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟔(𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟕(𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟖(𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟗(𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎(𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒅𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟏(𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟐(𝑳𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟑(𝑳𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟒(𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟏𝟓(𝑭𝑯𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟔(𝑭𝑯 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟏𝟕(𝑰𝑪𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟖(𝑰𝑪 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟏𝟗(𝑰𝑪 𝑫𝒆𝒐𝒎𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟎(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟏(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒕𝒉𝒏𝒊𝒄 𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝑻𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟐(𝑰𝑪 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟑(𝑰𝑪 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟒(𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟓(𝑰𝑪 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟔(𝑰𝑪 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑰𝒏 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟕(𝑰𝑪 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑻𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟖(𝑰𝑪 𝑺𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒐 − 𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)   +  𝝁𝓲𝒕  
 
o Variable Iteration 1: 
𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑮𝑫𝑷𝓲𝒕 = 𝒄 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝑷𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟒(𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓(𝑮𝒅𝒑𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟔(𝑮𝒅𝒐 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟕(𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟖(𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕)  +
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 𝜷𝟗(𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟎(𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟏(𝑳𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟐(𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒅𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟑(𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟒(𝑷𝑶𝑷𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟓(𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟔(𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟕(𝑭𝑯𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟖(𝑭𝑯 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟗(𝑰𝑪𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟎(𝑰𝑪 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐𝟏(𝑰𝑪 𝑫𝒆𝒐𝒎𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟐(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐𝟑(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒕𝒉𝒏𝒊𝒄 𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝑻𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟒(𝑰𝑪 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟓(𝑰𝑪 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟔(𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟕(𝑰𝑪 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟖(𝑰𝑪 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑰𝒏 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟗(𝑰𝑪 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑻𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟑𝟎(𝑰𝑪 𝑺𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒐 −
𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝝁𝓲𝒕  
 
o Variable Iteration 2: 
𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑮𝑫𝑷𝓲𝒕 = 𝒄 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝑪𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝑷𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟒(𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓(𝑮𝒅𝒑𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝓲𝒕) + 𝜷𝟔(𝑮𝒅𝒑 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟕(𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟖(𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟗(𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟎(𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟏(𝑳𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟐(𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒅𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟑(𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟏𝟒(𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟓(𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟔(𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟏𝟕(𝑭𝑫𝑰(−𝟏𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟏𝟖(𝑭𝑫𝑰 − 𝟐𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟏𝟗(𝑭𝑯𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟎(𝑭𝑯 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟏(𝑰𝑪𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +  𝜷𝟐𝟐(𝑰𝑪 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟑(𝑰𝑪 𝑫𝒆𝒐𝒎𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟒(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟓(𝑰𝑪 𝑬𝒕𝒉𝒏𝒊𝒄 𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝑻𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟔(𝑰𝑪 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟐𝟕(𝑰𝑪 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒕𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟐𝟖(𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝓲𝒕)  +
 𝜷𝟐𝟗(𝑰𝑪 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟑𝟎(𝑰𝑪 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑰𝒏 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝓲𝒕) +
 𝜷𝟑𝟏(𝑰𝑪 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑻𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)  +  𝜷𝟑𝟐(𝑰𝑪 𝑺𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒐 − 𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝓲𝒕)   +  𝝁𝓲𝒕  
 
 
IV. EMPIRCAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
MODEL STEPS - ITERATIONS 
 
TABLE 9 below displays the ordinary least squares regression conducted to test the 28 variables selected 
to test significance in the variability of FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP. The regression illustrates 
that the selected variables explain 47.7% of the variability in the dependent variable. The Durban Watson 
Stat is at 1.34 implying some multicollinearity. Two previous iterations of variables were regressed before 
using the final form. The previous iterations comprised the following characteristics:  
o Included Current account Balance as a percentage of GDP (eliminated in the final form we selected, 
since it is a mirror of imports + Exports and makes way by shifting significance for both Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP and Government Final Consumption Expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP).  
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o Included GDP per Capita, Population and Surface Area, which were replaced with the natural Log 
of GDP, natural Log of Population and natural Log of Surface Area. This was done to make their 
distribution more normal and reduce outliers in the variables and the actual variable influence since 
they are control variables in this study. 
 
The initial tests show that following variables are significant in determining the variability in FDINGDP 
at more than the 95% confidence interval: 
o FINAL VARIABLE SELCTION REGRESSION 
▪ Cellular Subscription per 100 inhabitants – significant at the 97% confidence interval 
▪ Exports as a % of GDP – significant at the 99% confidence interval 
▪ Imports as a % of GDP – significant at the 99% confidence interval 
▪ Government final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP – significant at the 95% 
confidence interval 
▪ Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP – significant at the 98% confidence interval  
▪ ICRG Investment Profile – significant at the 98% confidence interval 
o PREVIOUS VARIABLE ITERATION 
▪ FDINGDP (t-1) – significant at the 99% confidence interval 
▪ FDINGDP (t-2) – significant at the 99% confidence interval 
▪ Current Account % of GDP – significant at the 99% confidence interval 
 
Cellular subscription per 100 people – 0.0262 
Cellular subscription per inhabitant illustrates a highly positive coefficient of 0.58 at a very high confidence 
level of 0.0262, implying that the the variable is a same direction determinant of FDI. Cellular subscription 
is among the infrastructure indicator of an economy (UNCTAD, 1999). Countries with more advanced 
infrastructure level facilitate a more conducive platform for businesses to thrive, through accessibility and 
lower costs, in-trun generating higher FDI inflows. The results are consistent with several studies notably 
Morisset, 1992; UNCTAD, 1999; Asiedu, 2006 and Soremekun & Malgwi102012. 
 
Exports as a % of GDP – 0.0000 
Exports as a % of GDP illustrates a highly positive coefficient of 0.58 at a very high confidence level of 
0.0000, implying that the EXP%GDP is a same direction determinant of the dependent variable. This is 
consistent with basic economic theory that generically exports’ share of GDP implies a competitive 
                                                             
10  
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economic framework vs global peers and an ability to source foreign currency. This would probably be 
backdropped on either competitive local attributes such as low resource costs with cheap labor or highly 
accessible cheap technology. The results are consistent with the findings of Navaretti, Venables, & Barry, 
(2004) and Markusen & Maskus (2002). 
 
Imports as a % of GDP – 0.0000 
Imports as a % of GDP illustrates a negative coefficient of -0.405 at a very high confidence level of 0.0000, 
implying that the IMP%GDP is an inverse determinant of the dependent variable. This implies that over the 
large diverse country base IMP%GDP is a deterrent to FDI probably on the basis that countries with productivity 
significantly dependent on imports may generally imply low intrinsic value addition productivity and attractive 
business opportunities. Unbalanced trade weighted towards imports would also generically result in a lack of 
foreign currency availability and a potentially weak currency regime, which is classified as a significant 
deterrent to foreign investment due to cross currency losses overhang at the exit phase of all foreign equity and 
debt investment. This may be summarized with an implication of low intrinsic value addition productivity and 
a lack of attractive business opportunities, which are deterrents to FDI. Again, this is consistent with the results 
shown in (Kim and Kim, 2006 and Abell, 199011.). 
 
This paper’s model results on Trade, measured via Exports and Imports, shows significance in 
determining the variability in FDI. Trade may be argued to be the single largest contributing factor 
to this variability when statistical findings are complemented with basic data on countries with the 
largest trade vs. country’s which are the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investment. The charts 
below show that of the top 10 traders globally, 6 were in the 11 largest recipients of FDI in the year 
2017 (World Trade Report and UNCTAD). This is very strong corroboration of the statistical 
findings and accordingly can be viewed as a key aspect of focus for policy makers around the globe, 
and especially for regions who have been unable to unlock the difficult task of shifting their fortunes 
in attracting FDI. 
 
                                                             
11 Manoranjan Sahoo1 , M Suresh Babu2 and Umakant Dash3 Effects of FDI flows on Current Account Balances: Do Globalisation and 
Institutional Quality Matter? 
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Source: World Trade Organisation 
 
Source: World Trade Organisation 
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Source: UNCTAD 
 
Government final consumption expenditure % GDP – 0.0494 
GDP Growth illustrates a relatively low positive coefficient of 0.51 at a high confidence level of 0.0494 , 
implying that government expenditure is a same direction determinant of FDI. This is probably more 
pressing for weaker economies where government expenditure provides a regular lifeline to the economy 
to support economic productivity and growth. This resonates well with the Investment Development Path12 
in which Narula and Dunnig (2010) argue that government spending is crucial for FDI inflow to make the 
domestic economy more attractive for FDI inflows; productive expenditure in infrastructure, education, 
health and technology transfer.  
 
                                                             
12 IDP is part of the OLI paradigm, it is divided into five stage.   
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Gross fixed capital formation % GDP – 0.0198 
GDP Growth illustrates a relatively low positive coefficient of 0.31 at a high confidence level of 0.0198 , 
implying that investment is positively conducive to FDI. This resonates well with the findings of Plossner 
& Levine and Renelt13 (1992) where gross capital formation directly influences economic growth in two 
ways: increasing the physical capital stock or by promoting technology indirectly which leads a country to 
be more attractive to FDI inflows. The aforementioned is consistent with A. Amighini,. McMillan and 
Sanfilippo’s (2017).  
 
International Country Risk Guide, Investor Profile – 0.0202 
ICRG IP illustrates a positive coefficient of 0.87 at a high confidence level of 0.0202, implying that this 
variable computed by the systematically driven survey based framework, is a same direction determinant 
of the dependent variable. These findings are consistent with Chanegriha, Stewart and Tsoukis (2016) study 
which showcase that nations with greater democratic accountability have higher FDI, as well as Tintin 
(2013) who argues economic freedoms, state fragility and political rights, have the most significant impact 
on attracting FDI.  
 
The model results for ICRG investment profile also appear to be a key attribute to follow by policy makers 
as of the top 15 recipients of FDI as per the table above, 10 were within the top 15 countries ranked by the 
ICRG. However improving investment profile is a complex attribute to measure and improve, which 
indicates that significant improvement in this attribute will be more of a medium term goal to realistically 
achieve. 
   
PREVIOUS ITERATION SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES 
Current Account % of GDP – 0.0000 
Current Account Balance as a % of GDP has a negative coefficient of -0.49 at a very high confidence level 
of 0.0000, implying that the CAB%GDP is negatively correlated to FDI. This is consistent with basic 
economic theory that generically a stressed current account balance would be a deterrent to FDI inflows as 
it will largely affect investment in government treasuries and instruments in addition to equity investments 
in any currency regime that is not naturally lush with cash to sustain a fixed foreign exchange rate for a 
prolonged time. Kim and Kim, 2006 and Abell, 1990 explains that the rising capital inflows as well as the 
rising level of imports and decreasing level of exports, may appreciate domestic currency and worsen the 
economy’s current balance account.  
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TABLE 9 – Regression Model Results 
o Dependent Variable: FDI AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP  
o Method: Panel Least Squares  
o Sample: 1991 2016   
o Periods included: 26   
o Cross-sections included: 52  
o Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 905 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -161.3474 216.4933 -0.745277 0.4563 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES     
ACCESS_ELECTRICITY -0.123502 0.112890 -1.094003 0.2743 
EXPORTS_GDP *** 0.582710 0.079718 7.309659 0.0000 
IMPORTS_GDP *** -0.513320 0.067153 -7.644003 0.0000 
GDP_GROWTH 0.230282 0.124343 1.851989 0.0644 
LGDP -2.388210 1.975381 -1.208987 0.2270 
GOVERNMENT_FINAL_CE_GDP *** 0.506121 0.257107 1.968522 0.0494 
GROSS_FCF_GDP *** 0.309752 0.132712 2.334014 0.0198 
INFLATION -0.000852 0.003705 -0.229896 0.8182 
MANUFAC_VA_GDP -0.047904 0.211492 -0.226506 0.8209 
TAX_REV_GDP -0.025299 0.129500 -0.195356 0.8452 
     
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES     
LPOPULATION 12.58118 8.290836 1.517480 0.1295 
CELLULAR_SUBSCR_PER_100 *** 0.056660 0.025437 2.227430 0.0262 
     
ENDOWEMENT  VARIABLES     
NATURAL_RE_RENTS_GDP -0.242381 0.129738 -1.868239 0.0621 
LAREA -0.251878 14.27638 -0.017643 0.9859 
     
INSTITUTIONAL  VARIABLES     
ICRG_BUREACRACY 0.033733 1.536145 0.021960 0.9825 
ICRG_CORRUPTION 0.326727 0.698210 0.467950 0.6399 
ICRG_DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 0.900219 0.721040 1.248501 0.2122 
ICRG_EXTERNAL CONFLICT 0.160149 0.474950 0.337192 0.7361 
ICRG_ETHNIC TENSIONS 0.536573 0.865003 0.620313 0.5352 
ICRG_GOVERNMENT STABILITY -0.556081 0.346196 -1.606262 0.1086 
ICRG_INTERNAL CONLICT 0.090114 0.458759 0.196429 0.8443 
ICRG_INVESTMENT PROFILE *** 0.868304 0.373050 2.327582 0.0202 
ICRG_LAW&ORDER -0.150118 0.962657 -0.155941 0.8761 
ICRG_MILITARY IN POLITICS -0.098881 0.888752 -0.111258 0.9114 
ICRG_RELIGIOUS TENSIONS -0.002093 0.801680 -0.002611 0.9979 
ICRG_SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS -0.482378 0.438482 -1.100110 0.2716 
FREEDOM_HOUSE_CIVIL LIBERTIES 0.760407 1.043388 0.728786 0.4663 
FRAEEDOM_HOUSE_POLITICAL RIGHTS 1.360440 0.913184 1.489776 0.1367 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
R-squared 0.476774 Mean dependent var 5.629629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.408755 S.D. dependent var 11.67320 
S.E. of regression 8.975815 Akaike info criterion 7.335666 
Sum squared resid 64452.20 Schwarz criterion 7.893492 
Log likelihood -3214.389 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.548703 
F-statistic 7.009389 Durbin-Watson stat 1.340452 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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V. Conclusion 
This thesis takes a step back as opposed to the recent literature trend on FDI which is abundantly narrow 
scoped and detail oriented in terms of dimension; i.e. countries, regions, and variables. This thesis aimed to 
re-examine and assess the variables with the most significance in determining the variability of FDI inflows 
as a % of GDP, across a large number of variables and economies, regardless of their specifications and 
characteristics. This culminates in results that the variables that drive FDI the 95% confidence interval are as 
follows:  
 
o Trade - exports and imports as % of GDP,  
o Investment & Expenditure - Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP and general 
government final expenditure as a % of GDP,  
o Institutional Quality - International Country Risk Guide Investment Profile, and 
o Technological Accessibility - cellular subscription as a portion of population.  
 
Conversely, natural resource rents, tax revenue as a % of GDP, and GDP growth did not result to be 
significant in determining the variability in FDI for this wide-ranging dataset. 
 
As such, the indication is that governments should focus on improving trade facilitating infrastructure, 
technological accessibility, and institutional quality, stabilizing monetary and fiscal platforms. 
 
Policy Implication  
Policy recommendation are summarized in that trade openness is a very important determinant of FDI and, 
thus, efforts targeted at trade policies should be seriously pursued. Raising exports to attract FDI is a key 
policy for any government, policies must be designed to encourage the development of non-tradition exports 
and diversity commodities to avoid over dependence on a single good or service. Moreover, having bilateral 
trades’ agreements in different regions; to encourage cross-border trade, improve the quality of production 
and increase competition which makes the economy as a whole attractive on the global scale. 
 
In parallel, the government should create an investment climate that guarantees investor’s rights and 
investment overall framework through the presence of strong institutions, improve both the quality and speed 
of business regulation, and increase government support by establishing a strong rule of law and curbing 
corruption.  
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Limitation 
 
Although this thesis adds value in indicating that trade/trade infrastructure, financial and institutional variables 
are the main generic determinants for FDI, it is limited in that governments would need to complement these 
results with more specific research papers on select countries and narrower variable pools to come to a 
comprehensive view for each regional and specific country assessment. 
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VI. Annex 1 
TABLE 3: CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
AELC CELL 
CA-
GDP 
EX-
GDP 
FDI-
NGDP 
FRAI-
CL 
FRAI-
PR 
GDP 
Bn 
GDP-
CAP 
GDP-
G 
GFCE
-GDP 
GFCF
-GDP 
IC-BQ 
IC-
COR 
IC-DA IC-EC IC-ET IC-GS IC-IC IC-IP 
IC-L-
O 
IC-
MIP 
IC-RT IC-SC 
IMP-
GDP 
INFL LBR 
MVA-
GDP 
NERN
T-
GDP 
POP SURA 
TREV
-GDP 
TRD-
GDP 
LAR LGDP LPOP 
AELC 1.00 0.30 0.22 0.09 -0.05 -0.61 -0.60 0.16 0.42 -0.28 0.25 -0.06 0.65 0.41 0.63 0.25 0.37 -0.08 0.39 0.36 0.51 0.62 0.31 0.63 -0.04 -0.01 0.12 0.46 -0.66 0.09 0.04 0.30 0.03 -0.21 0.57 0.06 
CELL 0.30 1.00 0.09 0.28 0.16 -0.42 -0.27 0.12 0.48 -0.22 0.28 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.40 -0.17 -0.05 -0.16 0.06 0.53 0.12 0.28 0.08 0.35 0.22 -0.13 0.01 -0.13 -0.17 -0.01 -0.04 0.16 0.26 -0.12 0.35 -0.05 
CA-GDP 0.22 0.09 1.00 0.23 -0.18 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.38 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.33 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.19 0.01 0.28 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.24 -0.01 
EXP-BOP$ 0.25 0.27 0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.31 -0.28 0.86 0.46 -0.18 0.14 -0.11 0.41 0.25 0.31 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.36 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.37 -0.16 -0.05 0.68 0.02 -0.20 0.64 0.43 -0.14 -0.14 0.25 0.70 0.47 
EXP-GDP 0.09 0.28 0.23 1.00 0.47 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22 0.39 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.23 -0.04 0.26 0.89 -0.09 -0.37 -0.07 0.03 -0.39 -0.30 0.34 0.97 -0.70 -0.27 -0.64 
FDI-NGDP -0.05 0.16 -0.18 0.47 1.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.18 0.12 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.51 -0.03 -0.14 -0.14 0.11 -0.15 -0.10 0.11 0.50 -0.34 -0.17 -0.30 
FDIN_BP$ 0.19 0.21 0.06 -0.04 0.18 -0.25 -0.21 0.76 0.37 -0.07 0.08 -0.08 0.32 0.18 0.25 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.33 -0.08 -0.04 0.63 -0.05 -0.14 0.58 0.47 -0.09 -0.06 0.20 0.52 0.35 
FRAI-CL -0.61 -0.42 -0.11 -0.24 -0.08 1.00 0.91 -0.20 -0.58 0.24 -0.46 0.05 -0.70 -0.58 -0.80 -0.29 -0.40 0.05 -0.61 -0.58 -0.60 -0.78 -0.56 -0.72 -0.17 0.12 0.02 -0.06 0.57 0.10 0.05 -0.34 -0.21 0.39 -0.36 0.29 
FRAI-PR -0.60 -0.27 -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 0.91 1.00 -0.18 -0.50 0.24 -0.39 0.10 -0.69 -0.59 -0.82 -0.35 -0.38 0.09 -0.58 -0.47 -0.56 -0.81 -0.61 -0.66 -0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.61 0.07 0.04 -0.29 -0.14 0.34 -0.36 0.23 
GDP_$ 0.16 0.12 -0.01 -0.22 -0.08 -0.20 -0.18 1.00 0.29 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.26 0.13 0.19 -0.18 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.24 -0.22 -0.02 0.85 -0.03 -0.13 0.80 0.64 -0.18 -0.23 0.35 0.57 0.46 
GDP-CAP 0.42 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.18 -0.58 -0.50 0.29 1.00 -0.26 0.35 -0.06 0.72 0.60 0.57 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.40 0.53 0.62 0.48 0.30 0.73 0.23 -0.09 0.08 -0.10 -0.31 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.32 -0.24 0.50 -0.15 
GDP-G -0.28 -0.22 -0.05 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.24 -0.11 -0.26 1.00 -0.29 0.21 -0.28 -0.22 -0.27 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 -0.25 -0.15 -0.22 0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.28 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.27 -0.06 
GFCE-GDP 0.25 0.28 0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.46 -0.39 0.00 0.35 -0.29 1.00 0.12 0.49 0.39 0.42 0.26 0.18 -0.07 0.40 0.26 0.48 0.54 0.36 0.38 0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.29 -0.14 -0.06 0.49 0.14 -0.14 0.26 -0.13 
GFCF-GDP -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.10 -0.08 -0.06 0.21 0.12 1.00 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.13 0.12 0.11 -0.14 -0.06 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 
IC_BQ 0.65 0.24 0.33 0.22 0.03 -0.70 -0.69 0.26 0.72 -0.28 0.49 0.04 1.00 0.76 0.69 0.28 0.34 0.03 0.56 0.52 0.78 0.68 0.46 0.81 0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.53 0.03 0.03 0.36 0.15 -0.25 0.56 -0.09 
IC-COR 0.41 0.01 0.26 0.14 0.03 -0.58 -0.59 0.13 0.60 -0.22 0.39 0.01 0.76 1.00 0.56 0.35 0.38 0.05 0.55 0.27 0.71 0.54 0.48 0.65 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.38 -0.12 -0.06 0.28 0.09 -0.24 0.30 -0.22 
IC-DA 0.63 0.40 0.05 0.20 0.13 -0.80 -0.82 0.19 0.57 -0.27 0.42 -0.03 0.69 0.56 1.00 0.27 0.30 -0.07 0.53 0.49 0.60 0.76 0.47 0.64 0.18 -0.13 0.01 0.12 -0.52 -0.06 -0.06 0.29 0.20 -0.34 0.43 -0.16 
IC-EC 0.25 -0.17 0.21 0.20 0.06 -0.29 -0.35 -0.18 0.12 -0.06 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.35 0.27 1.00 0.44 0.00 0.57 0.03 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.22 0.11 0.07 -0.22 0.28 -0.24 -0.24 -0.12 0.17 0.16 -0.21 0.00 -0.24 
IC-ET 0.37 -0.05 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.40 -0.38 0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.18 -0.01 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.44 1.00 0.05 0.53 0.14 0.48 0.48 0.37 0.31 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.18 -0.28 -0.14 -0.12 0.17 0.03 -0.21 0.05 -0.24 
IC-GS -0.08 -0.16 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.14 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.13 0.32 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.11 -0.13 0.00 -0.05 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 
IC-IC 0.39 0.06 0.18 0.31 0.10 -0.61 -0.58 0.06 0.40 -0.11 0.40 0.14 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.13 1.00 0.30 0.65 0.69 0.46 0.53 0.25 -0.05 -0.11 0.16 -0.39 -0.17 -0.07 0.29 0.29 -0.37 0.12 -0.35 
IC-IP 0.36 0.53 0.16 0.22 0.14 -0.58 -0.47 0.25 0.53 -0.11 0.26 0.13 0.52 0.27 0.49 0.03 0.14 0.32 0.30 1.00 0.36 0.41 0.25 0.63 0.13 -0.14 0.05 -0.04 -0.27 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.18 -0.15 0.35 -0.12 
IC-LO 0.51 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.06 -0.60 -0.56 0.14 0.62 -0.19 0.48 0.14 0.78 0.71 0.60 0.34 0.48 0.05 0.65 0.36 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.17 -0.07 -0.10 0.14 -0.50 -0.16 -0.16 0.40 0.22 -0.35 0.34 -0.22 
IC-MIP 0.62 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.06 -0.78 -0.81 0.05 0.48 -0.25 0.54 0.03 0.68 0.54 0.76 0.47 0.48 -0.09 0.69 0.41 0.69 1.00 0.57 0.65 0.18 -0.04 -0.10 0.25 -0.66 -0.16 -0.13 0.39 0.21 -0.34 0.35 -0.21 
IC-RT 0.31 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.56 -0.61 0.12 0.30 -0.15 0.36 0.03 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.27 0.37 -0.03 0.46 0.25 0.46 0.57 1.00 0.43 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.39 -0.02 0.14 0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.27 -0.06 
IC-SC 0.63 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.09 -0.72 -0.66 0.24 0.73 -0.22 0.38 0.05 0.81 0.65 0.64 0.22 0.31 0.09 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.65 0.43 1.00 0.14 -0.06 0.05 0.13 -0.54 -0.02 0.02 0.41 0.21 -0.32 0.45 -0.20 
IMP-GDP -0.04 0.22 -0.07 0.89 0.51 -0.17 -0.12 -0.22 0.23 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.18 -0.07 0.14 1.00 -0.09 -0.37 -0.13 0.06 -0.40 -0.31 0.30 0.97 -0.70 -0.40 -0.64 
INFL -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 1.00 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.21 -0.08 -0.09 0.13 0.00 0.11 
LABR 0.12 0.01 -0.03 -0.37 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.85 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.22 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 0.07 0.05 -0.37 0.11 1.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.99 0.82 -0.31 -0.38 0.56 0.60 0.69 
MVA-GDP 0.46 -0.13 0.16 -0.07 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.28 0.18 -0.05 0.16 -0.04 0.14 0.25 0.07 0.13 -0.13 0.10 -0.01 1.00 -0.37 0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.03 0.19 0.17 
RNTS-GDP -0.66 -0.17 -0.09 0.03 0.11 0.57 0.61 -0.13 -0.31 0.28 -0.29 0.11 -0.53 -0.38 -0.52 -0.24 -0.28 0.12 -0.39 -0.27 -0.50 -0.66 -0.39 -0.54 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.37 1.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.28 0.05 0.23 -0.36 0.01 
POP 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.39 -0.15 0.10 0.07 0.80 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.14 0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.24 -0.14 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.16 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.40 0.13 0.99 0.00 -0.04 1.00 0.80 -0.33 -0.41 0.58 0.59 0.73 
SURA 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.30 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.64 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.16 -0.13 0.14 0.02 -0.31 0.21 0.82 -0.04 0.02 0.80 1.00 -0.26 -0.31 0.60 0.40 0.50 
TXRE-GDP 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.34 0.11 -0.34 -0.29 -0.18 0.22 -0.08 0.49 0.07 0.36 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.29 0.22 0.40 0.39 0.15 0.41 0.30 -0.08 -0.31 0.04 -0.28 -0.33 -0.26 1.00 0.33 -0.46 -0.09 -0.46 
LAREA -0.21 -0.12 0.01 -0.70 -0.34 0.39 0.34 0.35 -0.24 0.03 -0.14 0.01 -0.25 -0.24 -0.34 -0.21 -0.21 -0.05 -0.37 -0.15 -0.35 -0.34 0.02 -0.32 -0.70 0.13 0.56 0.03 0.23 0.58 0.60 -0.46 -0.72 1.00 0.39 0.76 
LGDP 0.57 0.35 0.24 -0.27 -0.17 -0.36 -0.36 0.57 0.50 -0.27 0.26 -0.06 0.56 0.30 0.43 0.00 0.05 -0.11 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.27 0.45 -0.40 0.00 0.60 0.19 -0.36 0.59 0.40 -0.09 -0.35 0.39 1.00 0.68 
LPOP 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.64 -0.30 0.29 0.23 0.46 -0.15 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.16 -0.24 -0.24 -0.13 -0.35 -0.12 -0.22 -0.21 -0.06 -0.20 -0.64 0.11 0.69 0.17 0.01 0.73 0.50 -0.46 -0.66 0.76 0.68 1.00 
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VII. Annex 2 
 
Indicator Name Long definition Source 
Access to electricity 
(% of population) 
Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to 
electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national 
surveys and international sources. 
World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All 
(SE4ALL) database from the SE4ALL 
Global Tracking Framework led jointly by 
the World Bank, International Energy 
Agency, and the Energy Sector 
Management Assistance Program. 
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value 
of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license 
fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude 
compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called 
factor services) and transfer payments. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other 
market services received from the rest of the world. They include the 
value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, 
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, 
financial, information, business, personal, and government services. 
They exclude compensation of employees and investment income 
(formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and data files. 
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of 
GDP) 
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also 
considered capital formation. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Current account 
balance (% of GDP) 
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and services, 
net primary income, and net secondary income. 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook and data 
files, and World Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is 
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This 
series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in 
the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP. 
International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and Balance of 
Payments databases, World Bank, 
International Debt Statistics, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
GDP (current US$) GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies 
using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the 
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to 
actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is 
used. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
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GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Manufacturing, 
value added (% of 
GDP) 
Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. 
Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined 
by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. 
Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the 
denominator. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Tax revenue (% of 
GDP) 
Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for 
public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, 
and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and 
corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative 
revenue. 
International Monetary Fund, Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files, 
and World Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. 
Total natural 
resources rents (% 
of GDP) 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, 
coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. 
Estimates based on sources and methods 
described in "The Changing Wealth of 
Nations: Measuring Sustainable 
Development in the New Millennium" 
(World Bank, 2011). 
Population, total Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values 
shown are midyear estimates. 
(1) United Nations Population Division. 
World Population Prospects: 2017 
Revision. (2) Census reports and other 
statistical publications from national 
statistical offices, (3) Eurostat: 
Demographic Statistics, (4) United Nations 
Statistical Division. Population and Vital 
Statistics Reprot (various years), (5) U.S. 
Census Bureau: International Database, 
and (6) Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community: Statistics and Demography 
Programme. 
Surface area (sq. 
km) 
Surface area is a country's total area, including areas under inland bodies 
of water and some coastal waterways. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 
electronic files and web site. 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general 
government consumption) includes all government current expenditures 
for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of 
employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and 
security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. 
World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
Labor force, total Labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who supply labor for 
the production of goods and services during a specified period. It 
includes people who are currently employed and people who are 
unemployed but seeking work as well as first-time job-seekers. Not 
everyone who works is included, however. Unpaid workers, family 
workers, and students are often omitted, and some countries do not count 
members of the armed forces. Labor force size tends to vary during the 
year as seasonal workers enter and leave. 
Derived using data from International 
Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database 
and World Bank population estimates. 
Labor data retrieved in September 2018. 
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 
100 people) 
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public 
mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular 
technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of 
postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. 
that have been used during the last three months). The indicator applies 
to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It 
excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to 
public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, 
radio paging and telemetry services. 
International Telecommunication Union, 
World Telecommunication/ICT 
Development Report and database. 
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International 
Country Risk Guide 
Political  
Risk 
The Political Risk Rating includes 12 weighted variables covering both 
political and social attributes. ICRG advises users on means of adapting 
both the data and the weights in order to focus the rating on the needs of 
the particular investing firm. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
  The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the 
political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable 
basis. This is done by assigning risk points to a preset group of factors, 
termed political risk components. The minimum number of points that 
can be assigned to each component is zero, while the maximum number 
of points depends on the fixed weight that component is given in the 
overall political risk assessment. In every case the lower the risk point 
total, the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point total the lower the 
risk. To ensure consistency, both between countries and over time, 
points are assigned by ICRG editors on the basis of a series of pre-
set questions for each risk component. 
 
  The ICRG staff collects political information and financial and 
economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk 
component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation. 
 
  The political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective 
analysis of the available information 
 
ICRG Government 
Stability 
Assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office.  The risk rating assigned is 
the sum of three subcomponents: Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength and Popular Support each with a maximum score of four points 
and a minimum score of 0 points.  A score of 4 points equates to Very 
Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.  
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG 
SocioEconomic 
Conditions 
Assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could 
constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction.  The risk 
rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: unemployment, 
consumer confidence and poverty, each with a maximum score of four 
points and a minimum score of 0 points.  A score of 4 points equates to 
Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Investment 
Profile 
Assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not 
covered by other political, economic and financial risk components.  The 
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: contract, 
viability/expropriation,  payment delays , each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 points.  A score of 4 points equates 
to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.    
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Internal 
Conflict 
Assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential 
impact on governance.  The highest rating is given to those countries 
where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, 
against its own people.  The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled 
in an on-going civil war.  The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence and 
civil disorder, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum 
score of 0 points.  A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a 
score of 0 points to Very High Risk.  
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG External 
Conflict 
Assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign 
action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic 
pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, 
sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-
out war). External conflicts can adversely affect foreign business in 
many ways, ranging from restrictions on operations to trade and 
investment sanctions, to distortions in the allocation of economic 
resources, to violent change in the structure of society. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: war, cross-border conflict 
and foreign pressures, each with a maximum score of four points and a 
minimum score of 0 points.  A score of 4 points equates to Very Low 
Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.    
  
International Country Risk Guide Index  
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ICRG Corruption Assessment of corruption within the political system.  Such corruption 
is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the 
economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of 
power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Military in 
Politics 
It refers to the risk of military involvement without a popular mandate. 
It ranges from 0 to 6. A lower score indicates high level and vice versa. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Religious 
Tensions 
Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or 
governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by 
religious law and to exclude other religions from the political and/or 
social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate 
governance; the suppression of religious freedom; the desire of a 
religious group to express its own identity, separate from the country as 
a whole.It ranges from 0 to 6. A lower score indicates high level and vice 
versa. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Law and 
Order 
An assessment  for the country's judicial system level. It ranges from 0 
to 6. A lower score indicates high level and vice versa. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Ethnic 
Tensions 
An assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality, or language divisions. It ranges from 0 to 6. Lower 
ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are 
high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise.  
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Democratic 
Accountability 
It measures the governance enjoyed by the country, it reflects the extent 
to which elections are free and fair. It measures of how responsive 
government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is. It 
ranges from 0 to 6. A lower score indicates high level and vice versa. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
ICRG Bureaucracy 
Quality 
It refers to the quality of the bureaucracy that tends to minimise revisions 
of policy when governments change. It ranges from 0 to 4. A lower score 
indicates high level and vice versa. 
International Country Risk Guide Index  
Freedom House 
Index Political 
Rights 
Evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 15 territories during 
2014. Each country and territory is assigned two numerical ratings—
from 1 to 7—for political rights with 1 representing the most free and 7 
the least free. Countries with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political 
rights, including free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected 
actually rule, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an 
important role and enjoys real power, and the interests of minority 
groups are well represented in politics and government. 
Freedom House 
Freedom House 
Index Civil Liberties 
Evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 15 territories during 
2014. Each country and territory is assigned two numerical ratings—
from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing 
the most free and 7 the least free. Countries with a rating of 1 enjoy a 
wide range of civil liberties, including freedoms of expression, 
assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established 
and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an 
independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive 
for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and minority 
groups. 
Freedom House 
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VIII. Annex 3 
 
 Country Continent Sub-Continent 
1 Algeria Africa North Africa 
2 Angola Africa Central Africa 
3 Argentina South America South America 
4 Belgium Europe East Europe 
5 Botswana Africa South Africa 
6 Brazil South America South America 
7 Burkina Faso Africa West Africa 
8 Canada North America North America 
9 Cameroon Africa West Africa 
10 Chile South America South America 
11 Cote d'Ivoire Africa West Africa 
12 Costa Rica South America South America 
13 Denmark Europe North Europe 
14 Czech Republic Europe East Europe 
15 Egypt Africa North Africa 
16 Ethiopia Africa East Africa 
17 Gabon Africa Central Africa 
18 Germany Europe Western Africa 
19 Ghana Africa West Africa 
20 France Europe West Europe 
21 Hungary Europe East Europe 
22 Ireland Europe North Europe 
23 Italy Europe South Europe 
24 Kenya Africa East Africa 
25 Luxembourg Europe West Europe 
26 Mauritania Africa West Africa 
27 Morocco Africa North Africa 
28 Mozambique Africa East Africa 
29 Namibia Africa South Africa 
30 Netherlands Europe West Europe 
31 Nigeria Africa West Africa 
32 Norway Europe North Europe 
33 Niger Africa West Africa 
34 Portugal Europe South Europe 
35 Rwanda Africa East Africa 
36 Peru South America South America 
37 Senegal Africa West Africa 
38 Serbia Europe South Europe 
39 South Africa Africa Southern Africa 
40 Spain Europe South Europe 
41 Sweden Europe North Europe 
42 Switzerland Europe West Europe 
43 Tanzania Africa East Africa 
44 Turkey Europe East Europe 
45 Uganda Africa East Africa 
46 United States North America North America  
47 United Kingdom Europe North Europe 
48 Uruguay South America South America 
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49 Zambia Africa East Africa 
50 Slovak Republic Europe East Europe 
51 Liberia Africa West Africa 
52 Cyprus Europe South Europe 
53 Malta Europe South Europe 
54 Congo, DR Africa Central Africa 
55 Congo Africa Central Africa 
56 Sierra Leone Africa West Africa 
57 Georgia Europe East Europe 
58 Poland Europe East Europe 
59 Madagascar Africa East Africa 
60 Equatorial Guinea Africa West Africa 
61 Guinea Africa West Africa 
62 Finland Europe North Europe 
63 Ukraine Europe East Europe 
64 Romania Europe East Europe 
65 Greece Europe South Europe 
 
 
